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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 17242

ERNEST JOE VELASQUEZ
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with one count of seconddegree murder in violation of

§

76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated

(1953), as amended, for the murder of Richard Whitehead.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
of second-degree murder on June 9, 1980, in the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Christine M. Durham, presiding.
Appellant waived the minimum time for sentencing
and was sentenced on June 9, 1980 by Judge Durham to serve an
indeterminate term of from five years to life in the Utah
State Prison as provided by law.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment and sentence rendered in the Third Judicial
District Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The decedent, Richard Whitehead, age 30 (T. 55),
was found dead in his apartment located at 242-1/2 South 200
East, #3, Salt Lake City, on November 22, 1979 by his brother,
Paul Whitehead.

Paul Whitehead had been attempting to contact

his brother for three days (T. 56-60).

His first attempt was

around 11:30 a.m. on the morning of November 19 after he had
been notified by the victim's employer that he had failed to
show up for work (T. 56).

He received no answer at his

brother's apartment and returned to try again later in the
afternoon (T. 57).

At that time, he saw Ernest Joe Velasquez,

the appellant, outside the apartment complex.

The appellant

asked Mr. Whitehead who he was looking for, and when Paul
Whitehead told him he was looking for his brother, Richard,
the appellant told him that the victim had gone to Las Vegas
with Steve Southwood, who also resided in the apartment
complex (T. 58).
On the 20th of November, Paul Whitehead attempted
three more times to locate his brother.

on the 22nd at about

9:00 a.m. he saw Mr. Southwood, who told him that the victim

-2-
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had not gone to Las Vegas with him (T. 59).

Mr. Whitehead

then contacted all the local hospitals in an attempt to locate
his brother.

Receiving no further information, he returned to

the apartment and, with the aid of Mr. Southwood, gained entry
into his brother's apartment through the bedroom window (T.
60).

He saw his brother lying on the bed and covered in rrlood

(T. 62).

He entered the room, told Mr. Southwood to remain

outside, and then went to the body of his brother to check for
a pulse (T. 63).

Finding none, he left the apartment and went

to a phone to call the police (T. 64).
During the course of the investigation, Officer
Voyles of the Salt Lake City Police Department discovered a
set of blood-smudged prints located on the wall above the bed
of the deceased.

At trial those prints were identified as

belonging to the appellant by Bill Simpson, an expert assigned
to the identification bureau of the Salt Lake City Police
Department (T. 351).

He testified that by using a comparison

technique he had found at least 11 points which matched (T.
360, 361, 370) the prints of the appellant.
In the apartment adjacent to where the victim was
found were two individuals under the supervision of the Utah
Division of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Office.
These individuals were Jessie Garcia and Ernest Velasquez (T.
127, 133).

on November 27, Officer Harris, the appellant's
-3-
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parole officer (T. 114), went to the apartment of the
appellant to finalize observations before verifying the
appellant's transfer of supervision from New Mexico to Utah

(T. 121).

He was accompanied by Sergeant Hanks of the

Sheriff's Office, who had been with him on ariother matter (T.
120).

The sergeant informed Harris of the recent discovery of

a body at the same location (T. 124).

While at the apartment,

Harris also discovered for the first time that Jessie Garcia,
who he knew was on parole in Utah, was living with the
appellant

(T. 121).

He also noted the presence of two

females who appeared to be juveniles (T. 122).
While with the appellant, Officer Harris discussed
appellant's need to obtain employment.

Appellant told Officer

Harris that it was difficult to obtain a job at that point
because he would have to be travelling to New Mexico to
testify in a murder case (T. 123).

Appellant also told

Officer Harris of another murder which he had witnessed in
prison (T. 124).

This knowledge of appellant's prior

involvement in murder cases was taken by Officer Harris to the
Salt Lake Police Department and to Officer Harris' supervising
officer in the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Dennis Holm
(T. 127, 133).
Appellant's transfer for supervision from New
Mexico was completed on November 9, 1979 (T. 127, 133).
-4-
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During the same time period, Officer Poulton, who
was Jessie Garcia's parole officer, received information from
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office that Garcia had offered
to secure cocaine and was dealing in drugs (T. 143).

He then

learned that the appellant was on parole and that, in
contravention of departmental policy, these parolees wereliving together (T. 143). He took this information to Dennis
Holm (T. 28, 144), who was his supervisor.
Dennis Holm compiled all the information received
from the individual parole officers and decided that a search
of the parolees' apartment ought to take place because:

1)

they were thought to be engaging in the sale of drugs, 2) they
were violating departmental policy by living together, 3) they
had no visible means of legal support, and 4) minor women had
been seen on the premises.

On November 29, six officers from

the Adult Probation and Parole Department went to the
parolees' apartment (T. 24, 144, 175, 184).
appellant led them into the front room.

On arrival, the

Officers Poulton,

Holm and Kelly went to talk to Jessie Garcia (T. 129).
Officer Harris, the appellant's parole officer,
asked the appellant to go to his bedroom to get out of the
commotion (T. 130).

Officer Coombs accompanied them and

entered the room first.

While in the room, he saw in plain

view on the shelf of the closet a box of .22-caliber shells
which he showed to Officer Harris (T. 26, 131, 181).

Harris
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then placed handcuffs on the appellant. Dennis Holm then
authorized a search of the entire premises (T. 25).

The

search produced a .22 automatic handgun (T. 111, 186) and a
magazine (T. 187) which were seized along with the .22 shells
and taken to Officer Voyles of the Salt Lake City Police
Department (T. 188, 203).
At trial appellant made a motion to suppress the
evidence obtained by the Adult Probation and Parole Department
since it was obtained in the course of a warrantless search
(T. l, 106).

The trial court denied this motion, finding that

the search was reasonable and conducted in furtherance of the
supervisory duties and obligations of the Division of Adult
Probation and Parole (T. 169).
The appellant and Miss Brenda valentine were
charged with the murder of Richard Whitehead (T. 658).

In a

statement given on December 6, 1979 (T. 650) to the police,
Miss Valentine claimed no involvement in the crime (T. 653).
She stated that on either the 17th or 18th of November the
appellant arose from bed, stated he wanted to fight with
someone, and left the apartment.

He returned a short time

later, took something from the apartment, and left again.
When he returned the second time, he was covered in blood and
told Miss Valentine that he had just "dusted" someone (T.
654).
-6-
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At trial, both the appellant and Miss valentine
changed their pre-trial stories and testified to a similar
state of events which implicated Miss Valentine as the
murderer (T. 429-447, 506-530).

Allegedly the victim had been

knocked unconscious by the appellant in a fist fight and Miss
valentine had then shot the victim.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to seconddegree murder on June 9, 1980 (T. 717).

Appellant then waived

the minimum time for sentencing and was sentenced to serve the
indeterminate term of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison (T. 721).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN A WARRANTLESS BUT OTHERWISE
REASONABLE SEARCH BY PAROLE OFFICERS.
Appellant, through counsel, made a timely motion to
suppress all the evidence removed from the appellant's
residence by parole officers.

The trial court held an

evidentiary hearing on the matter and determined that the
warrantless search by the Division of Adult Probation and
Parole was not unreasonable and did not constitute a per se
violation of appellant's Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
-7-
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Appellant claims that searches by parole officers
conducted without a warrant are the legal equivalent of
searches of law-abiding citizens by police officers without a
warrant.

This characterization fails to recognize that

persons on parole are not allowed the full extent of liberty
accorded law-abiding citizens.

The trial court recognized

that the liberty interest and privacy interest of parolees are
not the same as the ordinary citizen's, especially in the
relationship between a parolee and his parole officer.

For

this reason, Article I-§12 of the Utah Constitution has a
similar provision which this search did not violate.

The

trial court denied the motion relying on the reasoning of
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) (T. 170).
The trial court applied a reasonableness test to
the actions of the parole officers and found that the
circumstances of this case supported a reasonable suspicion
that either criminal activity was occurring or a parole
violation had occurred, and therefore in furtherance of the
duty to supervise parolees, the action of the Adult Probation
and Parole Division did not constitute an unreasonable
infringement on the appellant's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.

-8-
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A.

PAROLEES HAVE A LESSER EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY THAN ORDINARY LAW-ABIDING
CITIZENS.
Al though this Court has never addressed the

application of Fourth Amendment rights to parolees before, it
has examined the condition and limitations on individuals who
are on parole.

In Reeves v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 310, 501 P".2d

1212 ( 1972) this Court stated that "a parole is in the nature
of a grant of partial liability or a lessening of restrictions
to a convicted prisoner• (Id. at 1214).

The Court in that

case adopted the theory that a parolee is still "in custodia
legis" and subject to limitations of custody which do not
apply to ordinary law-abiding citizens.
The appellant argues that the theory of
"constructive custody" was buried in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972) (Appellant's Brief at 23); however, that case
did not totally disabuse the theory of legal custody except
where that custody theory was used to deny a parolee basic
elements of due process.

Hhen an individual is on parole, he

may still be subject to limitations stemming from the
custodial nature of parole.

Demonstrating that the theory of

legal custody has not been fully rejected in this
jurisdiction, this Court, in Ward v. Smith, Utah, 573 P.2d
781, 782 (1978) affirmed the rationale of~· supra, and
stated that "The parolee remal·ns in legal custody until such
-9-
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time as his sentence is terminated."

In that case, the Court

also noted that "Parole is not absolute liberty as all lawabiding citizens enjoy, but only conditional liberty dependent
upon compliance with parole restrictions."

573 P.2d at 782.

In a dicta statement of Reeves v. Turner, supra,
this Court noted that "[t]he standards governing the arrest
and search of citizens possessed of full civil rights are not
applicable to the act of taking physical custody of a
parolee."

(Id. at 1214).

This statement is consistent with

the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, where in Latta v.
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (1975), the Court noted that the
parole system of regulation and supervision naturally
diminishes the expectation of privacy of parolees.
B.

NOT ALL WARANTLESS SEARCHES BY PAROLE
OFFICERS OF PAROLEES' RESIDENCES VIOLATE
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF
REASONABLENESS.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) the

United States Supreme Court recognized that parolees cannot be
deprived of due process under a constrictive theory of
constructive custody.

The Court stated that minimum due

process had to be afforded to parolees in a revocation
hearing.

The Court, however, did not state that appropriate

limits tied to the parolee status can never be placed on the
constitutional rights afforded parolees.

The historical

-10-
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analysis of the parole system (Id. at 477-480) provides a
backdrop to the imposition of legitimate restrictions on the
liberty interests afforded to parolees.

The Court recognized

that the purpose of parole conditions are twofold in that:
•• : ~hey prohibit either absolutely or
conditionally, behavior that is deemed
dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society. And
through the requirement of reporting to
the parole officer and seeking guidance
and permission before doing many things,
the officer is provided with information
about the parolee and an opportunity to
advise him.
Id. at 478.

However, the extent to which a parole officer may

control a parolee is limited by standards of due process.

As

the Court has noted, "once it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due.•

Id. at

481.
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.

Thus, in

determining whether the search of a parolee's residence
without a warrant by his parole officer is a per se violation
of the Fourth Amendment, the analysis must focus on the
particular circumstances presented by such a search and by
balancing the interests of the parolee against the state
interest in having reasonable searches to determine whether
the parolee is meeting the conditions of his parole.
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although the United States Supreme Court and this
Court have never ruled on the extent to which the Fourth
Amendment may be invaded to ensure that parolees are living up
to the conditions of their parole, many state and federal
courts have examined the issue.

The leading case in the area

was written by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en bane.

The case produced an entire spectrum of

opinions regarding the nature of the privacy right held by
parolees.

The majority opinion in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521

F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1975) held that a search by a parole
officer, accompanied by police officers, of the appellant's
home was reasonable when the officer believed that the search
was necessary to the performance of his duty, as long as the
search was based on a reasonable suspicion of either criminal
activity or violation of parole.
The court in Latta recognized that the broad power
to search which was traditionally allowed in California was
subject to constitutional standards.

However, the issues

presented by the Fourth Amendment center around the
reasonableness of the search and the acceptance or rejection
of the traditional standard of probable cause required.

The

Ninth Circuit recognized that the fact that the traditional
standard of probable cause could not be met does not end the
Fourth Amendment inquiry.

In California, as in Utah (see:
-12-
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Reeves v. Turner, supra)

a "parolee is in a different

position from that of the ordinary citizen.

He is still

serving his sentence; he remains under the ultimate control of
the Adult Authority and the immediate control of his parole
officer."

521 F.2d at 249.

It is because of this special

relationship between a parolee and his parole officer,

an~

the

parole officer's duty to protect the parole system and the
public, that reasonable warrantless searches by the parole
officer are justified when the officer believes that the
search is necessary in the performance of his duties (Id. at
250).
The cornerstone of the Ninth Circuit Court's
reasoning is that not all searches without warrants by parole
officers are a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The

relationship of the parole officer and the parolee require
that:
the propriety of warrantless searches
pursuant to proper conditions affixed.to
the status of parole cannot be determined
by automatic reference.to the law of
ordinary search and seizure or to that of
administrative searches.
Id. at 251.
The majority opinion then limited warrantless
searches by parole officers to those which are reasonable.
Respondent submits that this analysis is the appropriate
-13-
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standard against which a balancing of the interests of the
individual and the rights of society may be accomplished.

The

majority of state and federal courts that have examined the
issue have adopted either the majority or concurring opinion
in Latta (See Appendix A, infra).
C.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THIS CASE WAS
REASONABLE.
The trial court adopted the majority's standard as

delineated in Latta v. Fitzharris, supra, and Point I-B above
(See also Appendix B, infra).
Prior to applying the Latta standard, the court
made the following findings of fact:
1) Appellant was in fact a parolee
subject to the supervision of the Utah
Division of Corrections at the time the
search was conducted.
2) The search was reasonable, and
conducted in furtherance of supervisory
duties and obligations of the Division of
Adult Probation and Parole to discover
whether:
a) the appellant and Mr. Garcia were
using or dealing in drugs,
b) they were involved in criminal
activities involving either drugs or
juveniles.
3) There was the presence of minors on
the premises;
4) There was information from an
informant respecting drug dealing; and
5) Appellant and Garcia each had a record
of prior similar crimes and were living
next door to where a murder took place.
(T. 169).

-14-
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These facts, when tested under Latta, justified the
search of the premises by members of Adult Probation and
Parole.
The cases cited by appellant do not detract from
the position adopted by the district court.

The Fourth

Circuit Court is the only circuit where the dissenting opinion
in Latta has been adopted.

The other state cases cited by

appellant are either distinguishable and/or recognize that the
rights of a parolee may be limited by virtue of the parolee
status.
In State v. Gansz, 297 So.2d 614 (Fla. App. 1974)
the court recognized that a probationer (not a parolee) is not
deprived of the constitutional guarantee of a search warrant.
However, the court also noted that status of the probationer
is an important factor "in determining whether a search and
seizure is reasonable or whether there is probable cause for
the issuance of a search warrant" (Id. at 616).

Implicit in

this language is the acknowledgment that the extent of
applying the constitutional rights afforded probationers is
not unnecessarily the same as applied against ordinary
citizens.
In both State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980)
and Roman v. state, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1977), the courts
relied on the state and not federal constitution to invalidate
-15-
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broad boiler plate conditions to parole and probation which
did not take into account the individual differences of each
parole in probation situation.

Alaska, however, specifically

limited the rejection of the form consent before it to the
facts of the case and also rejected the sweeping stand of the
Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, cert.
denied, 389

u.s.

938 (Iowa 1970), in footnote 29 stating:

Cullison involved a search and
seizure which was not conducted pursuant
to a condition of a parole and the court
did not there consider whether there were
any valid limits on a parolee's or
probationer's expectation of privacy.
The Alaska court then narrowly limited extensions of the
Fourth Amendment requirements by relying on its state
constitution.
In this case, the search was reasonable and
therefore, the warrantless search by parole officers, who were
simply doing their duty, did not violate appellant's right to
privacy.

At the very least there was not an invasion of the

privacy interest to any greater than that which exists by
virtue of the parole status.
The appellant also claims that the obtaining of the
information that appellant and Mr. Garcia were selling and/or
using drugs was insufficient to justify the search because it
came from the police department.

A similar argument is made

with regard to the conversations of Officer Voyles and Dennis
-16Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Holms.

In United States ex rel. Santos v. New York, 441 F.2d

1216 (2nd Cir. 1971) the court recognized that:
The mere fact that the police
officer was the first to suspect that
appellant was engaged in criminal
activity and related this fact to the
parole officer and was present at the
subsequent investigation in no way alters
the legality of the parole officer's
presence.
It does not require the
suppression of the seized evidence from
use in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Applying this standard and recognizing that in this case the
Adult Probation and Parole Department already knew that at
least one violation of parole standards was being violated
(since two parolees were living together, contrary to
departmental rules), the search and seizure of the evidence
from the home of the appellant was reasonable and within the
standards of the Fourth Amendment.
POINT II
CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH rs NON-PREJUDICIAL
DOES NOT JUSTIFY REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION.
The appellant claims that numerous errors (cited in
Point II of his brief at 26-38), although determined by the
trial court to be non-prejudicial when considered
individually, are transformed into prejudicial error
warranting reversal when they are accumulated.

This Court

-17-
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has recognized that great deference is given to the trial
court and reversal of verdicts which are sound will not be
made where an appellant raises mere technicalities or
irregularities unless they placed the defendant at a
substantial disadvantage.

In State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 426,

432 P.2d S3 (1967), this Court stated:
[O]nce a fair trial has been afforded the
defendant and a verdict which is
supported by the evidence rendered, the
proceedings are presumed to be valid; and
we are not disposed to reverse for mere
technicalities or irregularities unless
they put the defendant at some
substantial disadvantage or had some
material bearing on the fairness of the
proceedings or its outcome (footnote
omitted).
Id. at SS.

See also:

State v. Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468

P.2d 639 (1970); State v. Codianna, Utah, S73 P.2d 343, 349
(1977).
Acceptance of appellant's claim would require this
Court to state that quantity of non-prejudicial error without
demonstration of actual prejudice to the appellant somehow
transforms the harmless error into reversible error.

As

·demonstrated below, each error claimed by the appellant in the
trial court was determined to have no actual prejudice to the
appellant, nor influence on the outcome of the case.

In this

situation, the conviction of the appellant should be affirmed.

-18-
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A.

EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES IS WITHIN THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
'!be right to exclude witnesses and others from

certain types of proceedings is provided for by statute and is
in the sound discretion of the trial court.

The rule is found

in§ 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, which
states:
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE IN CERTAIN CASES, --In
an action of divorce, criminal
conversation, seduction, abortion, rape,
or assault with intent to commit rape,
the court may, in its discretion, exclude
all persons who are not directly
interested therein, except jurors,
witnesses and officers of the court; and
in any cause the court may, in its
discretion, during the examination of a
witness exclude any and all other
witnesses in the cause.
In this case, the trial court granted a motion to
exclude non-testifying witnesses (T. 50) at the begining of
trial.

However, near the end of trial it was discovered on

cross-examination that Officer Gillies had violated the
exclusionary rule by discussing Officer voyle's testimony
prior to testifying himself (T. 681).
Appellant made a motion for a mistrial based on the
violation of the exclusionary rule by the officers.

This

motion was denied when, outside the presence of the jury, the
court determined that the testimony of Gillies had not been
-19-
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affected by the discussion, the appellant was not prejudiced
by the violation, and, in fact, the testimony of Gillies
actually aided rather than harmed the appellant.

The court

ruled that no prejudice had occurred and denied the motion,
stating:
They should have known better; Miss
Valentine should have known better.
She
was here in the courtroom when she was
instructed. But I am unable to see any
fashion in which Detective Gillies'
testimony was influenced by his
conversation.
In fact, his recollection of what
Detective Voyles told him about the
testimony in the courtroom was not what
Detective Voyles had in fact testified
to, at least with respect to the
intoxication. And to that extent it
seems to me that the testimony you
elicited was helpful to the defendant
rather than prejudicial.
(T. 68, 69).

Thus, although the court recognized that the

officers were in error when they violated the exclusionary
rule, it was not prejudicial and therefore no basis upon which
the appellant could obtain reversal of his conviction.

State

v. Dodge, Utah, 564 P.2d 312 (1977) and State v. Carlson,
Utah, 635 P.2d 72 (1981).

Even in State v. Barboa, 506 P.2d

1222 (N.M. 1973), cited by the appellant, there is a
requirement that some type of harm be shown to the appealing
party before there is a basis upon which to reverse his
conviction.
-20-
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B.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE READING OF A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE BY TWO
JURORS WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
The trial court admonished the jury to ignore press

reports when the court recessed for the weekend (T. 586).

In

polling the jury on Monday, the court discovered that two of
the jurors had read a newspaper article in the Salt Lake Tribune which summarized the evidence presented at trial on
Thursday, June 5, 1979 (T. 596, 601).

Both jurors who

indicated exposure to the article, Mrs. Zabriskie and Mrs.
Bancroft, stated that the article did not present anything
which they had not already known from the presentation of
evidence.
The appellant moved for a mistrial and the trial
court denied the motion stating:
Well, I don't think a juror's
failure to follow the instructions of the
court is, per se, grounds for a mistrial.
I think you would have to demonstrate
some prejudice thereby. And if this were
a case involving multiple news reports
and accounts which the court could not
monitor I think that I probably would
have to: if anyone admitted to listening
to them and reading them. But whe~e we
are dealing with one newspaper article,
which I do have before me, I do~'t.have
it here today, but I have seen it in my
own newspaper, and I expect that the ~n7
thing we need to do is make i~ an exhibit
to the trial, although not a Jury
exhibit, in order for your to preserve
the case.
( T. 611) , and

-21-
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After I had read it I felt that even
if a juror should inadvertently or
improperly review that article that he or
she could not be improperly influenced by
it, because it was nothing more than a
recapitulation of what they had heard the
day prior in trial. And although I am
very concerned that two jurors did that,
and I intend to let the jurors know that
it is a serious problem before the trial
is out, it does not seem to me that in
this instance it can or has influenced
the outcome of the trial. And I will
deny the motion for a mistrial on that
basis.
This is not a case where the news reports were so
numerous that they could not be monitored by the court.

The

court was able to determine that the only article which two of
the eight jurors had read did not contain anything which was
likely to prejudice a juror but was, rather, a simple
reiteration of facts which did not cause actual prejudice.
In State v. Andrews, Utah, 576 P.2d 857 (1978) this
Court recognized that the granting of a motion for a new trial
based on exposure to media is a question which is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

Furthermore, this Court

stated the motion should be granted only where actual
prejudice or the inflammatory nature of the publicity creates
inherent prejudice against the appellant.
In this case, the newspaper article had been read
by the judge who determined that it was not so influential as
to in any way affect the jurors' ability to be impartial.
-22-
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This determination is justified by the record and does not
merit reversal of appellant's conviction.
C.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY
RESTRICT APPELLANT'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF
AN EXPERT WITNESS.
Bill Simpson was qualified by the state at trial as

an identification expert (T. 351).

He testified that prints

in blood, found inside the victim's apartment, had eleven
points of comparison with prints belonging to the appellant,
and it was therefore his opinion that the prints did in fact
belong to the appellant (T. 361).
On cross-examination, appellant attempted to
discredit the procedure used by the witness to compare the
fingerprints found with those of the appellant (T. 369).
Appellant's counsel was able to show that the expert had
failed to use a method of identification which required
measurement of the distance between certain ridges (T. 369).
'lbe appellant then attempted to impeach the reliability of the
test used by posing hypotheses based in hypothetical results
of the test which the expert admitted he did not use.

The

state objected to this line of questioning, claiming that it
called for an opinion of the witness which could not be based
on the facts in evidence (T. 370).

The trial court sustained

the objection, agreeing that the appellant could not pose
-23-
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hypothetical questions which did not have a basis in the facts
in evidence (T. 371).

The court stated that appellant was

entitled to hypothetical questions "unless you can establish
that there are those variances in this case" (T. 371).
This Court has consistently held that the extent of
cross-examination is a matter of discretion for the trial
court.

In State v. Starks, Utah, 581 P.2d 1015 (1978), this

Court stated that:
The matter of cross examination and the
extent thereof rests largely in the
discretion of the trial judge, and he
will be reversed only if he abuses his
discretion in a given case.
Even if an
error is made in limiting cross
examination, it is not to be reversed
unless it also is prejudicial (footnote
omitted).
See also:

State v. Maestas, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977) and

State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 384, 501 P.2d 636 (1972).
Thus, in order to find reversible error in the
restriction of cross-examining a witness, there must be clear
abuse of discretion by the trial court and a finding that
prejudice to the appellant resulted.
justified in the present case.

Neither finding is

Here the district court

limited the examination only when the appellant attempted to
question the expert about facts which were not only not in the
record, but which could not be placed in the record because
the test from which the questions were derived was not used
-24-
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in the present case.

Because the court did not prohibit the

defense counsel from shadowing the overall testing used by the
expert in the absence of the measurement test, there is no
showing that the failure to allow further questioning in any
way prejudiced the appellant.
Rule 58 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, relied 6n by
the appellant, does not apply to the facts of this case.

That

rule provides:
HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERT OPINION NOT
NECESSARY. Questions calling for the
opinion of an expert witness need not be
hypothetical in form unless the judge in
his discretion so requires, but the
witness may state his opinion and reasons
therefor without first specifying data on
which it is based as an hypothesis or
otherwise; but upon cross-examination he
may be required to specify such data.
'Ille rule recognizes the discretion of the trial court and is
designed to allow exposure of the weaknesses of that which
experts testify to, not that which is merely speculated upon
and not based on the facts of the case.
Therefore, the limitation imposed upon the
appellant was a correct exercise of the discretion of the
trial court and does not justify reversal, especially where
the jury was made aware of the fact that other mechanisms of
testing were available and not used.

-25-
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Furthermore, even the cases relied upon by the
appellant, while not requiring all the facts to be in
evidence, do require the hypothesis to be based upon a fair
combination of facts supported by the evidence.

See:

Samuel

v. Vanderheiden, 560 P.2d 636, 638 (Ore. 1977).

Since the

facts which the appellant attempted to question upon were not
supported by the evidence, the trial court correctly exercised
its discretion in sustaining the state's objection and the
appellant was not harmed thereby.
D,

ERROR IN FAILING TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
IMPROPER HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS NOT
PREJUDICIAL AND DOES NOT JUSTIFY
REVERSAL.
After Brenda Valentine testified that she had lied

to police officers in denying complicity with the crime when
she had initially been arrested for the murder of Richard
Whitehead (T. 529), the state called both police officers to
the stand and elicited testimony regarding the prior
inconsistent statement she had made on December 6, 1979.

The

defense counsel failed to object at the time the officers were
questioned, but after the fact made a motion to strike the
testimony claiming it was hearsay (T. 710).

'llle trial court

did not deal with whether the appellant had waived his right
to contest the testimony but ruled that on the merits of the
issue the testimony of the officers was hearsay but it
-26-
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fell within Rule 63(1) (a) and (b) of the hearsay exceptions.
The court stated:
THE COURT: Rule 63(1) says that a prior
statement of the witness is admissible,
even though hearsay, if the judge finds
that the witness had an adequate
opportunity to perceive the event,
provided that, (a) it is inconsistent
with his present testimoni, (b) it
contains otherwise admissible·facts which
the witness denies having stated or has
forgotten since making the statement.
And that would apply, or it will support
testimony made by the witness in the
present case when such testimony has been
challenged.
Well, that would be if someone else
offers it.
So you rely on subparagraphs (b) and
(a); inconsistency and contains otherwise
admissible facts.
(T. 711) and:
THE COURT: But that still doesn't
render the prior statement consistent
with all of her testimony, now. The jury
is entitled to consider the
inconsistency.
I would rely, in denying the motion
to strike, on subparagraph (b), that the
testimony of the officers ~bout her .
statements contains otherwise admissible
facts and that the witness denied having
stated or has forgotten it.
She denied, if I can recall. If I
can recall correctly there were at least
three statements on which she was crossexamined that she denied.

-27-
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MR. HOUSLEY: And there were a
couple she said she forgot she made, at
least she can't remember whether she made
them.
THE COURT: So on the basis of Rule
63(1), subparagraph (b), I will deny the
motion to strike.
(T. 712).

The court did recognize that it was possible to
subject a portion of the testimony to a motion to strike but
determined that:
it would be impossible for me to instruct
the jury on that question. I would have
to explain all of Rule 63(1),
subparagraph (b) to them, and I think
that is not feasible.
This Court should not disturb that determination where, as
here, the trial court is in the better position to observe and
understand the limitation on the jury's ability to perceive
and comprehend what portions the judge was attempting to
strike.

The further consideration of the trial court was that

the trial court needed to take the route least likely to
enhance any error to the detriment of the appellant.
Therefore, the actions of the trial court were proper and did
not result in prejudice to the appellant requiring reversal by
this Court.

This is supported by Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of

Evidence which states that this Court, in examining errors of
admission of evidence, should not reverse an otherwise sound
-28-
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conviction unless the error had a "substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict or finding."
E.

INTRODUCTION OF PICTURES TO REBUT POINTS
OF APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY WAS PROPER.
The appellant raised a motion in limine to pictures

which the state proposed to introduce to rebut specific
portions of the appellant's testimony at trial (T. 499).

The

court denied this motion in limine, determining that:
Although they are not pleasant to
look at, it is not this court's opinion
that they are so shocking and unpleasant
to se that they would constitute
prejudice merely because of that aspect,
and it is also my opinion that they
definitely have probative value, that
they may very well tend to show and that
the prosecution could argue from them in
closing argument that there are
inconsistencies betwen the location and
condition of the body and the defendant's
testimony on the stand.
(T. 500).

The court recognized that parties had entered into

a stipulation that was perfectly sufficient at the time
questions raised by the appellant's testimony made the
exhibits proper mechanisms for rebuttal (T. 501).
The state also placed in the record the fact that
the original stipulation was made more for defense than state
purposes (T. 501).

-29-
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r
Since the trial court determined that the probative
value, in light of the doubt cast by the testimony of the
appellant, outweighed the unpleasant (but not prejudicial)
nature of the photographs, there was no error in their
admission.
As

Investors v.

noted by appellant in First of Denver Mortgage

c.

N. Zundel, Utah, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (1979),

1:

this Court noted that parties may be relieved of their

I

stipulations by the court.

This was properly done in this

I
~~

case and the court did not clearly abuse its discretion in

1

errors were either not error at all or if they were error were

releasing the state from the stipulation.
Respondent has established that each of the alleged

I

111.1

\

~

I

harmless.

Where this is the case, accumulation of harmless

errors cannot establish prejudice to a defendant unless the
errors are so numerous and significant that the defendant's

l

right to a fair trial has been denied.

'I
I

this case are trivial both individual! and when examined

:1

together.

11

The harmless errors in

Thus, they do not warrant reversal of appellant's

1,

conviction.

i!!
,I

ii

IiI!
'I

:Ii
li.i

!I
!i
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed
because the trial court correctly applied, in light of a
lesser expectation of privacy, an exception to the search
warrant requirement where a parole officer and a parolee are
involved.

Secondly, the errors claimed by the appellant on

appeal were either non-existent or non-prejudicial and do not
justify a reversal of the conviction.
DATED this 25th day of January, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

~~!~"U
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R.
Brown, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
t, salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
Association, 333 South 200 Eas
this 26th day of January,
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the case of Mr. Velasquez or Mr. Garcia, but

if that were
the case, that he had had a prior history of doing
that the parole officer would be able to focus
and make it a condition of somebody's
that they could conduct searches of this
knowledgeable of it, put it

make them
agreement, and

have them sign it, which is quit

frequently done, but not

done in this particular case
are situations where people
10

on parole or probat' n in special circumstances, that

11

condition coul

12

without a

13

spell

14

15

e brought about where they could search

arch warrant.

I think it would have to be

out in their parole agreement or probation agreement

order to do that.
I don't think the court would be warranted in

16

this case in adopting Mr. Housley' s argument that the mere

17

fact that they are on parole in any way diminishes their

18

right to be secured in their own home from unreasonable

19

search and seizure, and that the minimum requirement of the

20

fourth amendment requires that they have a search warrant.

21

THE COURT:

Well, that means of formulating the issue,

22

though, sort of begs the question.

Because it is -not a ques-

21

tion of their having a right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures. - The question before us here is

,•.o

whether the search and seizure is reasonable, and one of

26

·
·
t he d eterrn1nat1ons,
or one of the standards, used in that

27

determination has to do with the expectation of privacy.

~8

And that gets us to the question of whether parclees have

29

a different kind of expectation of privacy than ordinary

30
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f 11 l

MR. BROWN:

well, with that balancing theory r don't

2

think you can lump all the parolees into one group and treat

3

them all the same.
THE COURT:

5
6

Well, I think that is what Latta does

in fact.

MR. BROWN:

That is what Latta does.

And that is

7

what I am suggesting that I think the trend of the law is

8

getting away from.

9

decision.

10

Latta is only a Federal Circuit Court

=
The other cases cited, that I have cited to

11

the court that have held contrary to that, are certain

12

court decisions.

13

THE COURT:

14
15

I don't have any of those opinions before

me, unfortunately.
Let me ask you this, too, Mr. Brown, which

16

poses considerable problems for me, and I will grant you,

Ii

at least based on the analysis provided by LaFave, accord-

18

ing to LaFave's analysis, the weight of the jurisdictions

19

or the weight of the precedent is in favor of warrantless

20

searches of parolees as being constitutionally permissible.

21

He does suggest and strongly advocates in his

22

analysis that the trend both ought to continue to be a

2.3

waiver of that kind of analysis and towards an application

24

of stricter standards or similar standards for parolees

25

and other citizens.

26
27

28
29
30

MR. BROWN:

Yes.

I believe he does indicate the

weight of the authority is that.
Now, if the court wants to count up the cases
and see where the weight of the authority is, I am sure
that the weight of the authority is considerably in support ,
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court to -3

THE COURT:

No.

I agree.

But that was a preface to

the question I wanted to ask you.
5
6

As far as you know, on the basis of the authorities you have submitted to me, this question has not been
dealt with at all by the Utah Supreme Court.

8
9

MR. BROWN:

Or the United States Su~reme Court.

THE COURT:

Or the United States Supreme Court.

And

10

you are literally requesting me to make some prediction,

11

you are asking me to make an impossible prediction, because

12

you are asking both for an indication of which way our

13

Supreme Court will go on this issue and, as I understand it,

I•

if this motion to suppress is granted, the matter cannot be

15

reviewed by our Supreme Court.
Is that correct?

16

17

MR. HOUSLEY:

18

THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.
And then to consider the question of

19

whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States may

20

in fact be willing to rule on the question.
Has search been denied in cases involving this

21

22

issue in the past?

23

MR. BROWN:

2•

MR. HOUSLEY:

25
26

27
28

Not to my knowledge.
Sure.

It was denied in the Santos case,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

· ht •
All rig

y es.

The Santos case i·sn't

as helpful, however.
MR. HOUSLEY:

That case stands for the proposition,

29

· is
· "'ased
on the same rationale
basically, of, although it
~

30

as the Latta case, the t h rus t of that case, and I don't
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

253

163

wher·e they used evidence that was not admissible at trial
2

for the parole revocation hearing.

3
4

THE COURT:

The court upheld the use of the evidence,

I understood.

5

MR. BROWN:

6

administrative hearing.

7

MR. HOUSLEY:

8

That was on the issue of consent.

So

it didn't really get into the question of the parolees.
THE COURT:

9

10

The court upheld the use of that at an

It didn't deal with. the search and

seizure question at all, it sounds like.
MR. BROWN:

11

But I would discourage the court, in

12

ruling on this question, to base it on which party has the

13

best vehicle for appeal.

14

THE COURT:

Well, that clearly would not be the

15

basis for my ruling.

16

in that area partly because it seems to me that there are

17

two equally strong and equally leaning lines of authority

18

on this question, neither of which has been considered and

19

ruled upon either by ¢ur Supreme Court or by the Supreme

20

Court of the United States.

-21

I simply indicated to you my concern.-

So I have absolutely no guidance•

whatsoever within this jurisdiction, and in that c9ntext I

22

think it does become significant, to me at least, to assess

23

the degrees to which my ruling would be reviewed in this

24

jurisdiction.
MR. BROWN:

25

The court has the material and the argu-

26

ment.

27

feel is the one that favors the parolee having the same

28

constitutional rights as an ordinary citizen.

29

30

I would ask the court to rule on the position that you

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you very much, Mr.

Brown.

Do you ~ave anything additional, Mr. Housley?
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MR. HOUSLEY:
2
3

Your Ho nor, I. would only mention

Mr. Brown's interpretation of Latta.

I th'
ink if you read
Latta it does not stand for the proposition that there
is a diminution of the parolee's constitutional rights.

5

It merely says that it has to be reasonable.

And in effect,

6

it merely says.·that it has to be reasonable, cana that is a

7

parolee and his parole officer making a s~arch is one of

8

the factors that goes into testing the reasonableness of
the search.

10

THE COURT:

Yes.

I agree.

I don't think Latta shlnds

11

for the constructive code theory at all.

They discuss the

12

constructive code there, and they identify it and isolate

13

it as having been a ground for the ruling in a number of case
that they cited in analyzing.

15

16
17

MR. BROWN:

They certainly wouldn't have permitted

the search like that of an ordinary citizen.
THE COURT:

No.

I agree.

However, the emphasis,

18

and I think really it comes out of the part of the Latta

19

opinion that discusses the fact that the warrant requirement

20

in their view would frustrate the purposes of the search

21

and the regulatory scheme of which it was a part, they

22

emphasize the regulatory scheme and the involvement of the

21

parole officer with tre parolee as a part of the rehabilitation process.

25
26

2;
28
29

30

They say, "We think it indisputable, in view of
the nature of the parolee and Of the .parole agent's responsibilities, as we have anlayze d them, that, were a warrant
required, the showing necess ary would have to be substanto avoid frustrating
tailly different from probable cause
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And then they go on to decide that that would
2

in fact make the whole warrant process totally unnecessary.

3

Frankly, I think that the sense is a very cogent thing about
that approach.

And in fact I think that the two approaches

5

to the problem are very cogently set out in Latta, both in

6

the major-ity opinion and in the dissent.

i

The majority opinion apparently makes a thresh-

8

hold determination that in the case 9f parolees you are

9

dealing -- and here is where the constructive code theory

10

probably comes in in a secondary capacity -- you are dealing

11

with a lesser expectation of privacy on the one hand and a

12

very high degree of regulation and a specialized relation-

13

ship between the parole officer and parolee on the other.

14

The dissent takes the position that warrantle&s

15

searches are , per se, unreasonable, and proceeds with its

16

analysis.

17

MR. BROWN:

That is Coolidge vs. New Hampshire.

18

THE COURT:

And proceeds with its analysis from there;

19

whereas, the majority says, "No.

20

status of parolees we can deal with the reasonableness

21

question from square one, rather than with the presumption

22

that exists with respect to other kinds of citizens.

23

All right.

Because of the special

I have had an opportunity to read

24

all of the citations which have been submitted to the

25

court by counsel and I have read LaFave's detailed analysis

26

of the cases and the theories in this area, and I suppose

27

it's clear from my comments during the course of your argu-

28

ments that it is not an easy matter for me to resolve.

29
30

I will make the following findings of fact in
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connection with the motion to suppress:

Number one, I find that the defendant was in
fact a parolee subject to the supervision of the Utah
Division of Corrections at th e t'ime t he search was conducted.
I believe that has been shown by a preponderance of evidence
in this hearing.
6

Number two, I am able to find as a matter of
fact that the search was reasonable, as it was conducted in

8

furtherance of the supervisory duties and' obligations of
the Division of Adult Probation and Parole at the time: that

10

is, to discover whether Mr. Garcia, and also with respect to

11

the defendant Velasquez, to discover, one, whether they

12

were using drugs or dealing in drugs: and number two, whethe

13

they were involved in related criminal activities involving

l~

either the drugs or possibly the juveniles.
I think that the facts on which the reasonable

15

16

suspicion of the parole officers was based have been set

17

forth in the evidence: namely, the fact that Mr. Garcia and

18

Mr. Velasquez were living together with no clear and visible

19

means of support, the employment of Mr. Velasquez being a

20

problem.

21

Number three, the existence of minors on the

22

premises in the past: number four, information from an

23

informant respecting drug dealing: and number five, the

2~

fact that a murder had taken place, or a killing, a violent
killing, had taken place in the apartment next door to the

26

location of the defendants and the past rec.ord of each of

27

the defendants, each of them having been connected in the

28

past with similar crimes, Mr. Garcia as a perpetrator and

29

Mr. Velasquez as a witness, and the apparent confusion noted

30

by witness
Harris of the place in the i11vestigation of that
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particular offense as to the identity of these defendants.
2

3

Now, the reason I isolate all of those facts is
I do not think and could not find as a matter of fact that
all of these factors together would have met a probable

5

cause standard, had application been made for a warrant.

6

However, as a matter of law I am finding that a reasonable-

7

ness standard may be applied in the special circumstances

8

of parolees.

9

That leads us to the

unde~lying

question of

10

whether the warrant requirement can be dispensed with in

11

the State of Utah.

12

this question, under the circumstances of this case I am

13

willing to take the progressive trend that's been argued for

14

by Mr. Brown on behalf of the defendant, if in fact it is a

15

progressive trend.

16

LaFave.

17

adopted in the State of Utah, and I am concerned under the

18

facts of this case about its application at the trial level.

19

And there being no law whatsoever on

That is how it is characterized by

I feel that it is unlikely that that would be

Therefore, I am going to hold as a matter of

20

law that the reasoning adopted by the Ninth-:Circuit in the

21

LaFave case is sufficient to substantiate my ruling here.

22

That's based, I think, in part, and of course anyone can

23

read the opinion and decide what it is based on, but I think

24

i t is based in part on a finding that reasonable expectations

25

of privacy belonging to a parolee are different in some

26

fashion from those of other citizens.

27

Number·two, the relationship between parole

28

supervision and parolees is such that there is a necessity

29

for unannounced searches based upon reasonable suspicion

30

of criminal activity or parole violation, which I have found
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I

as a matter of fact exist here.
2

I am going to take the position that the application of the reasonabl eness stan d ard is sufficient, even
though applied retroactively, and I do understand clearly

j

the theoretical problems with that.

6

that position.

But I am going to take

i

MR. BROWN:

Would the court state t,hat again, please? -

8

THE COURT:

That the reasonableness standard applied

9

retroactively to determine whether the searches of parolees

10

were valid is adequate to protect the constitutional rights

11

of parolees in the fourth amendment area.

12

For example, the LaFave case points out that in

13

any given case what is done in the way of a search may be

l~

so unreasonable as to require that it be struck down under

15

the fourth amendment, and they did not accept the notion that

16

a parole officer may conduct full blown searches of parolees'

17

homes whenever and as often as they feel like it.

18

with that characterization, and I don't think the LaFave

19

rationale stands for the proposition that parole officers

20

have complete discretion.

21

I agree

I think that wherever possible their discretion

22

ought to be exercised in the direction of obtaini~g a

2.'l

warrant for searches, but in this case I am not going to

2~

hold that the search is unreasonable either, because it

25

was without a warrant or on the basis of the fact that gave

26

rise to it, which means that the motion to suppress is

27

denied.

28

motion because of the reference made in opening statements.

29

30

the question of a mistrial
We don't have to go On to

12:00 and the jury has
It is now a quarter Of
t t hat we begin with
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